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FROM WRECKAGE COMES REASON:
HOW DETROIT
S CHAPTER 9 FILING HELPS
DEVELOP A PRACTICABLE AND PRINCIPLED
GOOD FAITHSTANDARD
SCOTT A. K RYSTINIAK
ABSTRACT
The city of Detroit is beginning to rise from the ashes following
decades of fiscal ineptitude, social failure, and corruption.
Bolstered by protections under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code,
Detroit has eliminated billions of dollars in debt and established
a feasible plan for municipal reorganization. Now, Detroit is even
considered an American comeback story. However, Detroits revitalization began on a tenuous foundation. The citys creditors objected vigorously to the bankruptcy petition by claiming that Detroit
had not filed its bankruptcy petition in good faith under § 921(c).
Despite the relatively scarce and imprecise case law and jurisprudence surrounding § 921(c), Judge Stephen Rhodes ruled that
Detroit met the good faith requirement in addition to all of the
requirements for Chapter 9 eligibility. In doing so, however, Judge
Rhodes forged a new path in Chapter 9 analysis and established a
practicable and principled good faith test. Now, Judge Rhodess
approach to § 921(c) good faith can serve as a beacon of reason in
an imprecise area of bankruptcy law.
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the author would like to thank his friends and fam ily for their unyielding
support. The author would also like to thank allthe wonderfuleditors and
staff of the William & Mary Business Law Review, who m ade this Note
possible. Yourdiligenceand patienceisforeverappreciated.
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INTRODUCTION
Once a thriving m etropolis and the backbone ofthe nation,
thecityofDetroitisnow facingunprecedented socialandfinancial
hardship. Between 2012 andearly2013, leadership from thecity
of Detroit and the state of Michigan began planning a civil
restructuring to com bat the city
s destitute condition.1 Shortly
afterthe appointm entofEm ergency ManagerKevyn Orrin the
sum m er of2013, the city ofDetroitopted for Chapter 9 bankruptcy afterloose negotiation proceedings failed to assuage the
city
s abundant creditors.2 It was the largest m unicipalbankruptcy filing in United States history, surpassing the previous
record byover400 percent.3 Finance expertscalculated Detroit
s
4
debtatover$18 billion. Over100,000 creditorsclaim ed tohave
a stake in the m assive debt.5 Despite itsapparenturgency, the
bankruptcy filing wasstrongly contested by m any ofthesecreditors.6 With over100 parties actively opposing the bankruptcy,
the objections included constitutional challenges and alleged
im proprietyand lack ofgood faith.7
Theobjectionsbased on lack ofgood faith proved tobeform idablecontentions.8 Mostoftheaccusationsalleging lack ofgood
1 Moni
caDavey& MaryWilliam sWalsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles
Into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytim es.com /2013
/
07/19/
us/
detroit-files-for-bankruptcy.htm l?pagewanted=all&_r=2&;MattHelm s
& Nathan Bom ey, Detroit Bankruptcy Time Line, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(July14, 2014), http:
//
archive.freep.com /article/20140713/NEWS01/307130100
/
detroit-bankruptcy-tim eline-DIA [http://perm a.cc/D3CU-ZCAF].
2 Davey& Wal
sh, supra note1.
3 See Aryn McCum ber, Beauty and the Beast: The Taxing Tale of the
Detroit Institute of Arts and the Largest Municipal Bankruptcy in History, 40
MI TAX L. 42, 65 (2014). Thepreviousm ark wassetin 2011 byJefferson County,
Alabam a, with athen-record $4billion in estim ated debt. Id.
4 Hel
m s& Bom ey, supra note1.
5 Id.
6 McCum ber, supra not
e3, at43.
7 In re Ci
ty ofDetroit, 504 B.R. 97, 110 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes noted that110 parties filed objections to Detroit
s
bankruptcyfiling. Id.
8 See generally id. at 18186. Bef
ore reaching his decision on Detroit
s
good faith, Judge Rhodes took the initiative to considereach ofthe objectors
theoriesofbad faith and thefactualsupportbehind them . Id.
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faith centered on whether the bankruptcy proceedings allowed
Detroit
s leadership to skirt the city
s financialobligations and
contravene workerbenefitsentrusted underthe Michigan State
Constitution.9 In decidingon theseobjections, bankruptcyJudge
Steven Rhodesadopted a rationale from severalpreviousChapter9 cases.10 However, Judge Rhodes
s consideration ofthe applicable law to supporthis ruling was m ade m uch m ore difficult
because the term good faith is not defined anywhere within
Title 11
s provisions.11 Furtherm ore, the case law addressing
§921(c)is m eager in its guidance for subsequent cases.12 Despite the relatively scarce and im precise case law and jurisprudence surrounding § 921(c), Judge Rhodesruled thatDetroitm et
thegood faith requirem entin addition toalloftherequirem ents
forChapter9 eligibility.13
This Note willexplore Detroit
sbankruptcy proceedingswith
an em phasison Detroit
salleged bad faith in itsinitialChapter9
bankruptcyfiling. PartI willfirstprovidea background on Chapter9 bankruptcy filingsgenerally, beginning with the purposes
and history ofm unicipalbankruptcies. Then, PartI willdiscuss
the good faith petitioning requirem entunder11 U.S.C. § 921(c)
and itsrelevantjurisprudence, orlack thereof. PartII willsetthe
Nick Carey, Analysis: Constitutional, Good Faith Arguments Unlikely to
Halt Detroit Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2013, 2:26 AM), http://www
.reuters.com /article/2013/08/20/us-usa-detroit-court-analysis-idUSBRE97J05
620130820 [http://perm a.cc/T7TE-F3L4].
10 See In re Ci
tyofDetroit, 504 B.R. at180. In addressingwhetherthecity
ofDetroitfiled its Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition in good faith pursuantto
§921(c), Judge Rhodeslooked to num erouscasesto constructthe applicable
law. Thesecasesarediscussed in PartII and PartIII ofthisNote.
11 See Good Faith Standard Required for Confirmation of Chapter 9 Plans,
GOODWIN PROCTOR (2012), http://www.goodwinprocter.com /~/m edia/82A5B4
B8568B4E239A228D5CB4980745.pdf [http:
//perm a.cc/DUD3-52LN] (The term

good faithis notdefined in the Bankruptcy Code, and there is lim ited case
law exploring itsm eaning in the contextofa Chapter9 plan.).
12 Id.
13 Chad Hal
com , Judge Rhodes: Detroit Bankruptcy, Filed in Good Faith,
Will Continue, CRAIN
S DETROIT BUS. (
Dec. 3, 2013, 9:46 AM), http://www
.crainsdetroit.com /article/20131203/NEWS/131209960/judge-rhodes-detroit-bank
ruptcy-filed-in-good-faith-will-continue[http://perm a.cc/FR6J-YZLE].
9
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backdrop for Detroit
s financialhistory leading up to the bankruptcyfiling, andthen addressthe§921(c)objectionsindetail.
Finally, PartIII ofthisNotewillhighlighttheapproach Judge
Rhodes took in ruling that Detroit
s bankruptcy filing was ultim atelyconducted in good faith. ThisNotewillreason thatJudge
Rhodes
s analysis on Chapter 9 good faith postulates a pragm atic
andprincipledexploration oftheChapter9 goodfaith requirem ent
and lays a solid foundation for an 11 U.S.C. § 921(c)analysis.
More specifically, this Note willargue thatJudge Rhodes
sfourpart analysis on good faith Chapter 9 filings creates a new
fram ework thatfillsa void in inconsistentand im precise Chapter 9 bankruptcy law. Now, with the nation held as a captive
audience, Detroit
sbankruptcy case can be a beacon ofreason in
anebulousareaofbankruptcylaw.
I. BACKGROUND:CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCIES
Chapter9 ofTitle 11 ofthe United StatesCode providesthe
statutory m echanism form unicipalitiesto file forbankruptcy.14
Like otherbankruptcy proceedings, the m ain goalofChapter9
bankruptcyistoprotectthefinanciallydistressed entityfrom its
creditors while allowing the entity to restructure its debtwith
the added oversight of the judiciary.15 For individuals, bankruptcylaw originatedin parttoprotectcitizensfrom creditorsin
order to avoid substantialdebtbecom ing tantam ountto indentured servitude.16 Municipalbankruptcy, on the other hand, is
designed to allow a m unicipalentity to continue itsgovernm entalfunctionswhilecivicofficialswork torestructurethem unicipality
sdebt.17 Although criticsrem ain ferventastothevalueof
14 11 U.S.C. §§ 901946 (
2014). These sections m ake up Chapter 9 ofthe
BankruptcyCode.
15 Chapter 9: Municipality Bankruptcies, USCOURTS.GOV (
2014), http:
//
www
.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/
Bankruptcy/
BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx[http:/
/
perm a.cc/KUB8-RXMY]. JustasChapter9 providesthe legalm echanism for
m unicipalbankruptcy, Chapter11 providescorporationswith an avenue for
thereorganization ofdebt.
16 See Thom asE. Pl
ank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN.
L. REV. 487, 51618 (1996).
17 See Chapter 9: Municipality Bankruptcies, supra not
e15.
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Chapter 9 bankruptcy, and itis often considered a lastresort
fora struggling m unicipality,18 Chapter9 bankruptcy rem ainsan
im portantfacetoftheBankruptcyCode.
Asa legalinstitution, bankruptcy isa com plex conglom eration
oflegalprocedure, businesslaw, and constitutionallaw.19 Chapter
9 bankruptcy is no different.20 In order to provide context for
Chapter 9 bankruptcy issues, Section A ofPartI ofthis Note
willprovidefurtherhistory and background on Chapter9 bankruptcy. Section B willthen discussChapter9 eligibility requirem entsunder11 U.S.C. §109(c). Finally, Section C willexam ine
Chapter9
sgood faith filing requirem entunder11 U.S.C. §921(c).
A. The History of Chapter 9 Bankruptcy
Despite the paucity ofChapter9 bankruptcy filings in com parison to their individualand corporate bankruptcy counterparts,21 Chapter9 filingsare stillan em ergentfield in both the
businessand thelegalworld.22 In fact, theabilityofam unicipality to file for bankruptcy only becam e possible during the
1930s.23 The United StatesCongressfirstenacted a law allowing
m unicipalitiestofileforbankruptcyin 1934.24 Despitearticulate
Henry C. Kevane, Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy: The New New
Thing?, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC.:BUS. LAW TODAY (May 2011), http://www
.am ericanbar.org/publications/
blt/2011/05/
01_kevane.htm l [http:
//
perm a.cc/
TAU7
-J6RN].
19 See generally Davi
d A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy be an Option
(For People, Places, or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 221725 (2014).
20 Id.
21 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States (
2012),
http://www.census.gov/library/publications/2011/com pendia/statab/131ed/busi
ness-enterprise.htm l[http://perm a.cc/7V76-UA4V]. According to the Am erican
BankruptcyInstitute, ofm orethan 55,000 m unicipalentities, fewerthan 600
havefiled forbankruptcyprotection since1937. In com parison, forthetwelve
m onth period ending June 30, 2007 alone, the Adm inistrative Office forthe
U.S. Courtsreported 450,332 Chapter7 filings, 5,586 Chapter11 filings, and
23,889 totalbusinessfilings. Id.
22 Om erKi
m hi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of
a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 352 (2010).
23 Chapter 9: Municipality Bankruptcies, supra not
e15.
24 Bankrupt
cyActof1898, Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934).
18
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drafting, however, only twoyearslater, theSuprem eCourtheld
thatthelaw wasunconstitutionalin Ashton v. Cameron County
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1.25 As a federallaw thatheavily
influenced the state
s ability to oversee its internalaffairs, the
bankruptcy provision atissuein Ashton raised statesovereignty
concerns under the Tenth Am endm ent.26 This com es as no surprise, as concerns stem m ing from the Tenth Am endm entare a
persistentpointofcontention in Chapter9 filingsand continue
tooccurin bankruptcyfilingstoday.27
In thewakeofAshton, Congressfollowed itsunsuccessfulendeavorwith a revised m unicipalbankruptcy actin 1936.28 The
Suprem eCourtultim atelyruled thatthisiteration wasconstitutionally perm issibletwoyearslaterin United States v. Bekins.29
ThestatutorystructureofChapter9 bankruptcieswould rem ain
largelyunchanged untilthe1970s.30
As m entioned above, Chapter 9 bankruptcy shares sim ilar
goalswith itsindividualand corporatebankruptcycounterparts.31
However, alargedifferencebetween Chapter9 bankruptcycases
and other types ofbankruptcies is the relative involvem entof
the court.32 In allbankruptcy cases, a specialized bankruptcy
court is responsible for overseeing an entity
s debt restructuring.33 In corporate or individual bankruptcy cases, the court
s
oversightinvolvesa painstaking review ofa vastnum berofthe
entity
s transactions.34 A bankruptcy court m ay also play a
substantialpartin actually creating therestructuring plan forindividualsand corporations.35 However, thebankruptcy courthas

298 U.S. 513, 532 (1936).
Id.
27 Kevane, supra not
e18.
28 Bankrupt
cyActof1989, Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653 (1937).
29 Uni
ted Statesv. Bekins, 304U.S. 27 (1938).
30 Ki
m hi, supra note22, at365.
31 Kevane, supra not
e18.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
25
26
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a reduced role in Chapter9 cases.36 Generally, the bankruptcy
courtshave two m ain objectivesin Chapter9 cases.37 First, the
bankruptcy courtwillactasa gatekeeperin the beginning ofa
m unicipalbankruptcycase.38 Atthisstage, thebankruptcycourt
willdeterm ine a m unicipality
s Chapter9 eligibility.39 Thesecond
m ain objectiveofthebankruptcy courtistoapprovethem unicipality
s finalized restructuring plan upon the com pletion ofthe
bankruptcyproceedings.40 Furtherm ore, m unicipalitiesthem selves
arelefttocreatetheirown restructuringplan.41
Although the bankruptcy courts willhave a reduced role in
the overallrestructuring schem e, m unicipalities deem ed Chapter9 eligible are entitled to certain specialprotectionsthatare
unique to Chapter 9 cases.42 These protections are designed to
furtherassistthem unicipality in continuing itscivicoperations
forthebenefitofthe public;m eanwhile, the m unicipality
sofficials
43
can restructure the debt. The protections afforded to m unicipalities generally lim it the ability of creditors to reach the
m unicipality.44 For exam ple, in individual or corporate bankruptcy, a creditorm ay be able to foreclose orrepossessa debtor
s
assetsin orderto satisfy the debtor
sdebt. Such an analog isnot
availablein theChapter9 context;a m unicipality
screditorm ay
notforeclose a civicbuilding in an effortto recuperate its debt
because the building isputto use forthe generalpublicwithin
Id.
Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. The reduced rol
e ofthe judiciary in m unicipalbankruptcy cases is
groundedin Tenth Am endm entconcerns. Id. Form orereadingon Tenth Am endm entconcernsin Chapter9 cases, see JulietM. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 45859 (2014).
42 Kevane, supra not
e18.
43 Id.
44 In re MountCarbon Met
ro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999)
([U]nlike Chapter11 [ofthe Bankruptcy Act], Chapter9 cases cannotbe involuntarily initiated by creditors;creditorsm ay notproposea plan;a trustee
cannotbe appointed;and the inability to reorganize cannotresultin liquidation ofthem unicipality
sassetsunderChapter7.).
36
37
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them unicipality.45 Furtherm ore, a m unicipality
sdebtorscannot
forcethem unicipalitytoliquidateitsassetsinvoluntarily.46
Som e ofthe other protections afforded to m unicipalities in
Chapter9 bankruptciesthatare notreciprocated in othertypes
ofbankruptciesalsodirectly reflectthelevelofinvolvem entofthe
court. Forexam ple, am unicipalityisnotsubjecttothereporting
duty in which itm ustcom m unicate transactionaldata directly to
thebankruptcycourt.47 Thisfreedom isnotreciprocated in other
types ofbankruptcy.48 Furtherm ore, a m unicipality is stillaffordedtherighttoborrow andspendwithoutcourtauthority.49
B. Chapter 9 Eligibility Standards Under § 109(c)
Because ofthe added protections and freedom s afforded to
m unicipalities in Chapter9 bankruptcy proceedings, one ofthe
m ain procedural differences between Chapter 9 bankruptcies
and their corporate and individualbankruptcy counterparts is
the threshold a m unicipality m ust m eet in establishing its
Chapter 9 eligibility.50 Furtherm ore, creditors have the added
ability tochallengesuch eligibility.51 Section 921(c)ofChapter9
is written as if it bestows upon the judiciary a discretionary
power in dism issing a bankruptcy petition for failing to m eet
this threshold: After any objection to the petition, the court,
after notice and a hearing, m ay dism iss the petition ... ifthe
petition doesnotm eetthe requirem ents ofthis title.52 In practice, however, courtshavebeen reluctanttointerpret§921(c)so
broadly and concludethatfailuretom eettheChapter9 eligibility standards requires m andatory dism issalofthe bankruptcy
Moringiello, supra note41, at45859.
David G. Heim an, HeatherLennox, LoriSinanyan, Mark K. Sisitsky &
JayantW. Tam be, An Overview of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: Municipal
Debt Adjustments, JONES DAY (Aug. 15, 2010), http://www.jonesday.com
/an-overview-of-chapter-9-of-the-bankruptcy-code-m unicipal-debt-adjustm ents
-08-15-2010/[http://perm a.cc/57ZB-9W2R].
47 See 11 U.S.C. §1107 (
2012).
48 Id.;see also 11 U.S.C. §904(
2012).
49 See 11 U.S.C. §904(
2012).
50 See Ki
m hi, supra note22, at35657.
51 See id. at357.
52 11 U.S.C. §921(
c)(2012).
45
46
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petition.53 Therefore, thepetitioning m unicipality m ustshow by
a preponderanceoftheevidencethatitsatisfieseach ofthefive
elem entsunder11 U.S.C. §109(c)in ordertom eettheChapter9
eligibilitythreshold.54
Thefirstelem entofeligibilityunder§109(c)m andatesthatan
entityfilingforChapter9 bankruptcym ustm eetthedefinition of
m unicipality under Title 11.55 Title 11 reads the definition of
m unicipalityasa politicalsubdivision orpublicagency orinstrum entality ofa state.56 Thisrequirem entdoesnotlim ittheeligibility strictly to cities or other localgovernm ents.57 By including
publicagencyorinstrum entality ofthe state,the Bankruptcy
Codeallowsentitiessuchasschooldistricts, sanitationresourceproviders, andevenlocalhealthsystem stofileforChapter9 relief.58
The second elem ent for Chapter 9 eligibility is set out in
§109(c)(2)and requires the state to authorize the m unicipality
asa debtorunderTitle 11:
An entity m ay bea debtorunderchapter9 ofthistitle ifand
only ifsuch entity ... isspecifically authorized, in itscapacity
asa m unicipalityorbynam e, tobea debtorundersuch chapterby Statelaw, orby a governm entalofficerororganization
em powered by Statelaw toauthorizesuch entity tobea debtor
undersuch chapter....59

State authorization is an im portantaspect ofChapter 9 cases
becauseitcircum ventsm anystatesovereigntyissuesarisingfrom
theTenth Am endm ent.60
See Int
lAss
n ofFirefighters, Local1186 v. City of Vallejo, 408 B.R.
280, 289 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009)([C]ourts have construed § 921(c)to require
the m andatory dism issalofa petition filed by a debtorwho failsto m eetthe
eligibility requirem ents under § 109(c).);In re Sullivan Cty. Reg
l Refuse
DisposalDist., 165 B.R. 60, 83 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994)(Thedebtorsin thepresent
case have failed to establish the requisites for Chapter 9 relief ... under
§109(c)... and therefore theirpetitionsm ustbedism issed ....).
54 Hei
m an etal., supra note46.
55 11 U.S.C. §109(
c)(2012).
56 11 U.S.C. §101(
40)(2012).
57 CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 109 (
3d ed. 2014).
58 Id.
59 11 U.S.C. §109(
c)(2)(2012).
60 Mori
ngiello, supra note41, at45859.
53
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Third, thepetitioningm unicipalitym ustbe insolventunder
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3).61 Insolvency is a heightened requirem ent
thatisnotreciprocated in non-Chapter9 bankruptcy provisions.62
Insolventis defined within the Bankruptcy Code as a financial
condition whereby a m unicipality is generally not paying its
debtsasthey becom edueunlesssuch debtsare the subjectofa
bona fide disputeor is unable to pay its debts as they becom e
due.63 Despite thisdefinition, insolventisstilla som ewhatindefinite term with potentially outcom e-determ inative powers.64
However, som ecourtshavegonetoconsiderablelengthstoaddress
this haziness in the past.65 Ultim ately, objections based on the
insolvency requirem ent are substantialweapons in a creditor
s
arsenalbecause they surreptitiously allow creditorsto weigh in
on aChapter9 filingwhilestallingthebankruptcyproceedings66
and ensuring that m unicipalities are not unduly resorting to
Chapter9 reliefinstead ofoptingforprivaterestructuring.67
11 U.S.C. §109(c)(3)(2012).
Sara Coelho, Is the Debtor Bankrupt Enough? Application of the Chapter 9 Insolvency Test to the City of Vallejo, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
(Apr. 13, 2011), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com /chapter-9/is-the
-debtor-bankrupt-enough-application-of-the-chapter-9-insolvency-test-to-the-city
-of-vallejo/[http://perm a.cc/J7ZL-BD8W].
63 11 U.S.C. § 101(
32)(C)(i)(ii)(2012).
64 See Coel
ho, supra note62.
65 See generally In re Ci
ty ofVallejo, 408 B.R. 280 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).
When thecity ofVallejo, California filed forbankruptcy in 2009, thecity
screditors argued thatthe city was notinsolventfor purposes of§ 109(c)(3). Id.
The bankruptcy courtoverseeing the case viewed insolvencyas a financial
condition whereby a m unicipality
s cash flowis so restricted thatitcannot
pay offdebtsdue within the nextyearand stillhave the flexibility touseits
rem aining funds to continue requisite m unicipaloperationsand progress with
othercreditornegotiations. See id. at29094. The courtultim ately upheld the
city
s eligibility and a bankruptcy appellate panelfrom the Ninth Circuitaffirm ed. Id. at290.
66 See Coel
ho, supra note62. Even when creditorsfailtogeta bankruptcy
petition dism issed forwantofeligibility, Coelhosuggeststhatcreditorsreceive
a tacticaladvantagejustfrom contesting a m unicipality
seligibility because
eligibility litigation can tie up the bankruptcy proceedings while creditors
seek privatenegotiationswith them unicipality. Id.
67 Meagan Cost
ello, Chapter 9 Eligibility: The Test for Insolvency (Part 2 of
3), GOODWIN PROCTOR (Jan. 29, 2013), http://blog.m unibk.com /chapter-9-eligi
bility-the-test-for-insolvency-part-2-of-3 [http://perm a.cc/Q3FQ-9C7W].
61
62
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The fourth elem ent ofChapter 9 eligibility under § 109(c)
requiresthe petitioning m unicipality to desire[]toeffecta plan
to adjust such debts.68 This requirem ent is highly subjective
and corresponds with the good faith filing requirem ent under
§921(c), which isaddressed laterin thisNote.69 Essentially, the
petitioning m unicipality m ustillustratethatitsbankruptcy filing
istheresultofan intention torestructureitsdebtratherthan to
evadecreditorsorbuytim e.70
Thefinalelem entforChapter9 eligibility under§109(c)addressespre-petitioning negotiationsbetween them unicipality and
itscreditors.71 Under§ 109(c)(5), the m unicipality can satisfy the
fifth requirem entifitfalls into any offour categories for prepetitioning negotiations.72 More specifically, the m unicipality
m ustdem onstratethat(1)ithasreached an agreem entwith its
creditors;(2)ithasnegotiated with itscreditorsin good faith;(3)
negotiations would be im practicable;or (4)a creditor would be
able to obtain a preference.73 The categories under § 109(c)(5)
ensurethatChapter9 filingsarenotcapriciousbutstillprovide
Chapter9 bankruptcy asan option form unicipalitiesstruggling
tonegotiatewith creditorsprivately.74
Thefiverequirem entsunder§109(c)arem andatoryhurdlesa
m unicipalityfaceswhen filingforChapter9 bankruptcy. However,
a m unicipality
s eligibility does notend with those five requirem ents. Even ifa m unicipality can m eetthe eligibility requirem entsunder11 U.S.C. §109(c), a creditorcan stillchallengethe
m unicipality
s Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition based on lack of
good faith in itsfiling.75

11 U.S.C. §109(c)(4)(2012).
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 900.02[2][d](Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Som m erseds., 16th ed. 2014).
70 Id. (
A statem entby the m unicipality ofits intentto im plem enta plan
ofadjustm entcoupled with evidence ofactions taken and/orbeing taken by
them unicipalityin furtheranceofsuch intentshould besufficienttom eetthe
statutory requirem ent.).
71 11 U.S.C. §109(
c)(5)(2012).
72 Id. at(
B)(D).
73 Id.
74 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra not
e69.
75 11 U.S.C. §921(
c)(2012).
68
69
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C. The Good Faith Filing Requirement
Although som eofthe requirem entsunder§ 109(c)touch upon
Chapter 9
s good faith filing requirem ent, the Bankruptcy Code
stillexplicitlym andatesthem unicipalitytofileitspetition in good
faith under§921(c).76 PartI, Section B ofthisNotecited§921(c)
duetoitsrolein requiring them unicipality tom eetcertain eligibility thresholds.77 However, in addition to providing the statutory scaffolding for the court to dism iss Chapter 9 bankruptcy
petitionsbased on ineligibility, theprovision alsoim posesa duty
on the m unicipality to conduct its filing in good faith.78 In its
entirety, § 921(c)reads:After any objection to the petition, the
court, afternoticeand a hearing, m ay dism issthepetition ifthe
debtor did not file the petition in good faith or ifthe petition
doesnotm eetthe requirem entsofthistitle.79
The good faith filing requirem entisnotunique to Chapter9
cases.80 However, the rationalebehind §921(c)also alignsitself
with som e ofthe otherunique requirem entsforChapter9 bankruptcy. Asm entioned before, som eoftheserequirem entsentwine
them selves with constitutionalissues under the Tenth Am endm ent.81 The m ost com pelling reason for these requirem ents is
the nature ofthe entity filing forbankruptcy. As m entioned in
Part I, Section B, both the court
s and the creditor
s roles are
m inim ized com pared to individual and corporate bankruptcy
cases.82 AttheheartofChapter9 bankruptcyistheprotection of
the m unicipality forthebenefitofthe civiccom m unity. However,
§921(c)ofthe Bankruptcy Code isa finalthreshold thata m unicipalitym ustovercom e.
Id.
See supra PartI.B.
78 See 11 U.S.C. §921(
c)(2012).
79 Id. (
em phasisadded).
80 TheBankr
uptcy Codeexpressesa good faith filing requirem entin alm ost
every type ofbankruptcy. To be specific, 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)establishes the
good faith filingrequirem entforChapter7 cases. 11 U.S.C. §1112(b), aswell
asa wealth ofcaselaw, establishesthegood faith filingrequirem entforChapter11 cases. The Chapter13 good faith filing requirem entis codified at11
U.S.C. §1307(c).
81 See supra PartI.A;see also Mori
ngiello, supra note41, at45859.
82 See supra PartI.B.
76
77
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Section 921(c)ofthe Bankruptcy Code is the cornerstone of
thisNote. Because§921(c)hasthepotentialtocom pletely thwart
am unicipalityfrom successfullyfilingforChapter9 bankruptcy,
it carries a wealth ofstatutory potency.83 Surprisingly, good
faith the core term ofthe provision is notdefined anywhere
within §921(c), noranywhereelsewithin theBankruptcy Code,
despitethisoutcom e-determ inativepower. Leftwith littlestatutory guidance, courts have considered the good faith requirem entunder§921(c)in m yriad ways. Despitethesevariousgood
faith practices under § 921(c), there is stillno definitive standard in the Chapter 9 bankruptcy context. Furtherm ore, as it
stands, no single good faithadaptation orinterpretation stands
outasparticularly instructiveorillustrativein Chapter9 cases.84
Therem ainderofPartI, Section C willaddressalternativegood
faith practicesand discussthedifficultiestheypresent.
1. The Chapter 11 Good Faith Test
The m ost established endeavor to system atize a good faith
testoccursin theChapter11 bankruptcy context.85 Becausethe
Bankruptcy Code fails to offer a good faith definition, judges
have used Chapter 11 cases to develop a good faith analysis.86
83 See supra PartI.B. Spread t
hroughoutChapter9 jurisprudence, however,
courtsand scholarshavenoted thatthediscretionarylanguageof§921(c)does
not call for the m andatory dism issal of a bankruptcy petition for m unicipalitieswhofailtofilethepetition in good faith. See In re Cty. ofOrange, 183
B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). See also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note69. However, alm ostnocaseshavespecificallyaddressed thisperm issive
nature. See In re CityofSan Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2013)(stating thatalm ostno caseshave addressed the perm issive language
of§ 921(c)in term s ofa dism issalrequirem entbutrationale regarding the
finality ofa dism issalofa m otion to dism issthe petition based on bad faith
under § 921(c) sheds light on the judiciary
s discretion in dism issing the
Chapter9 bankruptcypetition). Id. at791.
84 See generally PaulD. Leake, Making the Case for a Good Faith Chapter
11 Filing, JONES DAY (Dec. 2004), http://www.jonesday.com /newsknowledge
/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=2083 [http://
perm a.cc/LA7V-4PL7] (Unfortunately, case law guidance on the concept of
good faithis often abstruse,
offeringlittleconcreteguidance, and som etim escontradictory.).
85 See id.
86 See, e.g., In re Sul
livan Cty. Reg
lRefuse DisposalDist., 165 B.R. 60, 80
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1994).
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Som ebankruptcycourtspresidingoverChapter9 caseshavethen
looked tothese Chapter11 casesin the pastin orderto grasp a
m eaningfultestfor§ 921(c)
sgood faith requirem ent.87 Although
Chapter 11
s test has been the basis for Chapter 9 good faith
determ inationsinthepast, noform aladoptionhasoccurred.88
Thetestin Chapter11 callsforalargelysubjectivegoodfaith
assessm entthatevaluates the petitioner
s bankruptcy filing with
an eye toward dism issing the bankruptcy petition for cause.89
In theseChapter11 cases, thelongstandingtestpresentsadichotom y:[t]he test is whether a debtoris attem pting to unreasonably deterand harasscreditorsor attem pting toeffecta speedy,
efficient reorganization on a feasible basis.90 This test allows
the courts to look into an am algam offactors,91 butultim ately
asks the courts to get into the debtor
s head and subjectively
determ ine the debtor
s m otives for filing for bankruptcy.92 Because of this, alleged bad faith is often found when debtors
attem pttousebankruptcy proceedingsin an efforttoabusethe
judicialprocessfortheirbenefit.93 Likein Chapter9 cases, ifthe
courtdeterm inesthatthedebtorhasfailed tofileitsbankruptcy
petition in good faith, then thecourtshoulddism issthecase.94
87 See id. at 81 (
Determ ining whether a [chapter 11]petition has been
filed in good faith requires an evaluation of a debtor
s
financialcondition,
m otives, and thelocalfinancialrealities.Thesecom m entswould appearto be
equally applicable, atleastin part, to a Chapter9 petition.).
88 See id.
89 See In re Arnol
d, 806 F.2d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 1986);In re Marsch, 36
F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994). See also 11 U.S.C. §1112(b)(2012).
90 In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at828 (
citingIn re Arnold, 806 F.2d at939).
91 In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at828.
92 See Leake, supra not
e84.
93 See id.
Bad faith generally referstoa chapter11 filing with thepurpose ofabusing the judicialprocess. For instance, a chapter
11 filing for the sole purpose offending off litigation (e.g.,
foreclosure)ifthe debtorhasnorealprospectofreorganizing
itsbusinessisoften found toqualify asthekind ofabusethat
risesto the levelofbad faith. Sim ilarly, a filing by a solvent
debtorm erely to obtain a tacticallitigation advantage hasalso
been found tobeabusive.
Id.
94 See 11 U.S.C. §1112(
b)(2012).

250 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:235
Although this good faith test proves m ostly sufficient and
equitablein theChapter11 context,95 subsum ing thesam eChapter 11 good faith testto Chapter 9 bankruptcies as an official
practiceposesthreesignificantproblem s. Theseproblem soriginate
from the factthatthe dichotom y derived from Chapter11 case
law presentsan either/orscenarioin which theentirebankruptcy
case sitson a knife
sedge.
Thefirstproblem arisesregardlessofthefactsofthespecific
Chapter 9 case athand or the standard the bankruptcy court
usesto reach itsdeterm ination. Itarisesbecause currentbankruptcy courts are not given any statutory guidance on how to
adjudicate the good faith filing requirem entand m ust rely on
inconsistentcaselaw orforgetheirown path.96 In such a context,
judgesarefrequentlyasked tospeculateon theintentionsofthe
See Lawrence Ponoroff& F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good
Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW.
U. L. REV. 919, 921, 94647 (1991)([T]he bankruptcy courtsadaptation of
thegood faith doctrinepresentsan excellentexam pleofthelaw in evolution,
a processwe believe to be describable in m eaningfulterm sfrom the positive
law of the cases.). Ponoroffand Knippenberg discuss how Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases use the good faith filing requirem ent to com bat corporations
abusing bankruptcy proceedings in order to solve particular business problem s or exigencies thatcannotbe solved through m ore traditionalbusiness
m odels. Id. at921 ([G]ood faith istransform ed from a tired cliché, invoked in
suspiciousresponsetoan array ofnovelfilings, toa usefulinstrum entpressed
into service by the courts to bring order and standards to the business of
assuringthatbankruptcypolicyand purposesevolvein asensible, purposeful
way.). But see RobertJ. Bein, Subjectivity, Good Faith and the Expanded
Chapter 13 Discharge, 70 MO. L. REV. 656, 658 (2005)([T]he law views subjective determ inations... asinherently lessstable.). In thisarticle, the author
ultim ately argues for a m ix ofboth subjective and objective analysis in determ ining good faith;however, healsohighlightsdifficultiesofan inherently
subjectiveanalysis. Id. at685 (The law m ustbe sufficiently objectiveasto be
predictablesothatindividualscan ordertheiraffairswith som econfidencein
how theywillbetreated bythelaw. Withoutobjectivity, thelaw devolvesinto
disorder.(footnoteom itted)).
96 In t
hecontextofChapter7 bankruptcies, theEighth Circuithasechoed
concernsthatthe lack ofa statutory basisforgood faith willbe 
em ployed as
aloosecannon which istobepointed in thedirection ofadebtorwhosevalues
do not coincide precisely with those ofthe court.
 In re Huckfeldt, 39 F.3d
829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994)(citing In re Latim er, 82 B.R. 354, 364 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1988)).
95
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bankruptcy petitioners.97 Leaving such an unrestrained opportunity for unilateraljudicialdiscretion has raised red flags in
the past, and these concerns are found in m any types ofbankruptcy law.98 In fact, Congressresponded toa lack ofuniform ity
in bankruptcy casesin the nottoo distantpastwhen itcreated
theBankruptcy AbusePrevention and Consum erProtection Act
of2005.99 In ordertocurb potentialprejudicesand raisejudicial
accountabilityin thebankruptcycontext, som escholarsadvocate
forfurtherlegislativeactivism .100 However, afittingpieceoflegislation has yetto solve this problem , and the particularissue of
lack ofstatutoryguidancewith regardto§921(c)islikelytopersist
untilthe Bankruptcy Code isam ended, ora single, unified test
becom esawidelyaccepted standardforfuturecases.
The second problem isthatthe Chapter11 testcould result
in toolighta burden form unicipalitiestom eetwhen petitioning
for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. The thrust ofthe Chapter 11 good
faith filinganalysisistom akesure thatthe debtor
sm otivesare
notantitheticalto the basic purposes ofbankruptcy.101 Meanwhile, challenging a m unicipality
s good faith is only one of a
verylim ited num berofopportunitiesthata creditorhastocom bat
a m unicipal bankruptcy due to the m unicipality
s protections
102
underChapter9.
Therefore, ifcreditors are only leftto challenge a Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition based on the argum ent
thatthem unicipalityhasfiled itspetition forreasonsadverseto
the basic purposes ofbankruptcy, then creditor-objectors m ay
repeatedly fail to have a m unicipality
s Chapter 9 petition
103
dism issed. Thisfailureisalikelyresultbecausem unicipalities
See Bein, supra note95, at658.
In re Huckfeldt, 39 F.3d at832. See also Bein, supra note95, at658.
99 Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174, 189
(2012). BAPCPAwas signed into law alm osta decade ago with an im petus
tostream linetheadm inistration ofbankruptcy cases. Thenew statutory provisions created enhanced statutory standards for bankruptcy professionals to
m eetwhen attem ptingtorestructuredebt. Id.
100 Bei
n, supra note95, at658.
101 See Leake, supra not
e84.
102 In re MountCarbon Met
ro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999).
103 See In re Ci
ty ofSan Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 788 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 2013). In thiscase, thecourtconcluded thatitwasenough toshow proper
intentforChapter9 bankruptcy by taking an affirm ativestep tofilechapter9
97
98
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have an inherentpowerto argue thatthe Chapter9 bankruptcy
petition wasfiled so thatthe m unicipality can continue itscivic
functions while benefiting from Chapter 9 protection from its
creditors.104 Ifthe Chapter11 testofpeeking into the m indsof
the petitioner is the test used in Chapter 9 cases, then civic
officials willlikely be able to preem pt good faith challenges by
showing theiraspirationstokeep a m unicipality running, despite
both well-grounded and ardentpressuresfrom itscreditors, and
actualbad faith in them unicipality
ssubjective intentions.105
Finally and in contrastto m aking thegood faith petitioning
requirem ent too easy the third problem is that Chapter 11
s
good faith test could afford creditor-objectors an unbridled
opportunity to thwarta m unicipaldebtor
s Chapter 9 bankruptcy
attem pt. This was a prim ary concern in Detroit
s bankruptcy
106
case. In thealternativetothe second problem above, thisthird
problem could resultwheneverthecourthasthe capability to determ inewhetherthedebtorisusing thebankruptcy proceedings
in any way inconsistentwith an efficient reorganization on a
feasible basis. Again, challenging a m unicipality
s good faith
filing isoneofthefew safeguardscreditor-objectorsaregiven in
a Chapter 9 bankruptcy case.107 However, as m entioned previously, §921(c)hasoutcom e-determ inativepowerand thisallows

thatitcould restructure the debtand im pair the creditors as necessary to
achievea balanced budget.Id.
104 See id.;see also In re Sul
livan Cty. Reg
lRefuse DisposalDist., 165 B.R.
60, 82 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994). In In re Sullivan, thecourtdism issed thebankruptcy petition because the m unicipality presented no evidence of any
m eaningfuldiscussion of[sic]whattype ofplan m ightbe appropriate under
Chapter9.Id. Thissuggeststhateven am enialeffortin discussingaChapter9
would justifyfilingforChapter9 bankruptcy. Id.
105 See generally In re Ravenna Met
ro. Dist., 522 B.R. 656, 684 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 2014). Thiscaseseem stosuggestthatthegood faith requirem entunder
§ 921(c)is likely to be m etifthe petitioning m unicipality can articulate a
threat to the health and well-being of the citizens. Id. Because providing
services is within the purview ofm unicipalities and they can controlthese
services, alm ost any m unicipality facing budget issues could articulate a
threattothehealth and well-beingofthecitizensbystating thattheservices
arein jeopardy.
106 In re Ci
tyofDetroit, 504B.R. 97, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
107 In re MountCarbon Met
ro. Dist., 242 B.R. at33.
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creditor-objectorsthe opportunity to have a Chapter9 case dism issed.108 Therefore, a creditor-objectorneed only show thatthe
m unicipality hastaken actionsthatarenotdirected towardsan
efficientreorganization on a feasible basisand the bankruptcy
courtcould dism isstheChapter9 petition, even iftheChapter9
filing was onsetby the proper purposes and bankruptcy is the
m ostadequatelegalrem edyforthem unicipality.
The Chapter11 good faith testultim ately provestoo im precise and either too accom m odating or harsh for the m unicipal
bankruptcy context, depending on the specificcircum stances of
the case. Overall, a Chapter11 analogy isan im practicable and
m isguided prospectfora unified Chapter9 good faith analysis.
Although a void exists in Chapter 9
s good faith jurisprudence,
the void likely willnotfind an adequate substitute in its individualorcorporatebankruptcybrethren underChapter11.
2. Other Alternative Tests for Chapter 9 Good Faith
Withouta form altestto draw from , courtshaveapproached
Chapter9 casesin am ultitudeofways. In som ecases, bankruptcy
courts m erely take a cursory glance into the m unicipality
s good
109
faith filing requirem ent.
However, bankruptcy courts have
alsotaken a m oreholisticapproach in previousChapter9 bankruptcy cases and considered m any im portant aspects that frequentlyarisein good faith filingchallenges.110
See supra PartI.B.
See In re Pleasant View Util. Dist., 24 B.R. 632, 639 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1982);In re Vills. atCastle Rock Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 81
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). In thesecases, thecourtsdonoteven providea basis
for§921(c)eligibility, yettheyboth stillciteitasm andatoryauthority.
110 See In re Ci
tyof San Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 790 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 2012)(As in m any other considerations ofgood faith in the context of
bankruptcy, thetestisatotalityofthecircum stanceswheretheCourtisgiven
the powerto weigh the num erous factors in lightofthe circum stances as a
whole in determ ining whethergood faith is lacking.); In re Mount Carbon
Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. at4041:
Borrowing from thegood faith analysis of Chapter 11 and
Chapter13, itiseasy to conclude thatthe Courtshould consider the totality ofthe circum stances. The factors which a
108
109
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Whilesom ecourtswillim putetheChapter11 good faith test
into a Chapter 9 case, som e ofthe jurisprudence surrounding
Chapter9
sgood faith requirem entm erelypayshom agetoChapter 11
s dichotom ous test.111 Perhaps the m ostperm eating consideration is the bankruptcy court
s willingness to inquire into
theintentofthebankruptcypetitioner.112 Asseen in Chapter11,
thisconsideration isnota significantbreakthrough in Chapter9
good faith analysis butillustrates the im portance ofthe bankruptcy petitioner
s m otives and goals in its filing. Overall, for
reasonssim ilartothedifficultyofapplyingthisinquiryin Chapter11 cases, determ iningthesubjectivem otivesofthepetitioning
m unicipalityaloneisa largely unpersuasivetestthatm akesthe
proceedingsverydifficultforboth thebench andopposingparties.
Whilem anyChapter9 casesfacetiouslydancearound Chapter
11
sgood faith test, som e casesgo wellbeyond the sim pleeither/or
analysisthattheChapter11 testm andates.113 Today, m any scholars and opinions cite Collier
s bankruptcy resources as the m ost
unifiedcollection ofChapter9 goodfaith analysis.114 Itreads:

Courtshould exam ine in each chapterinclude:(1)whethera
plan com ports with the provisions and purpose ofthe Code
and thechapterunderwhich itisproposed, (2)whetheraplan
isfeasible, (3)whetheraplan isproposed with honestyand sincerity, and (4)whether a plan
s term s or the process used to
seek itsconfirm ation wasfundam entallyfair.
111 See In re Pl
easantView Util. Dist., 24B.R. at639;In re Vills. atCastleRock
Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. at81. In thesecases, thecourtsdonoteven provide
abasisfor§921(c)eligibility, yettheyboth stillciteitasm andatoryauthority.
112 See In re Ci
ty ofSan Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 78991 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 2013);In re N.Y. City Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 28081
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010);In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 72021
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009);In re Cty. ofOrange, 183 B.R. 594, 608 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1995). Allthese casescite the inquiry into the subjective intentof
them unicipalitywhen filingforChapter9.
113 See id.
114 See In re Ci
ty ofSan Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. at78586;In re N.Y.
City Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. at274;In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth.,
414 B.R. at714;In re Cty. ofOrange, 183 B.R. at608. These fourcasescite
Collier
swhen determ ining §921(c)
srequirem ents.
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Thefactsthatm ay berelevantin a good faith inquiry include
(i)the debtor
s subjective beliefs;(ii)whether the debtor
s financialproblem s fallwithin the situations contem plated by
chapter9;(iii)whetherthe debtorfiled itschapter9 petition
forreasonsconsistentwith thepurposesofchapter9;(iv)the
extentofthe debtor
s prepetition negotiations, ifpractical;(v)
theextentthatalternativestochapter9 wereconsidered;and
(vi)thescopeand natureofthe debtor
sfinancialproblem s.115

Much ofthe language in Collier
s is subsum ed from Chapter
11 analysis.116 However, even with six factors for bankruptcy
courtstoconsider, thereisstillnoinstructiveim petusfordealing
with §921(c)
s concerns. Withoutm ore specificity, judges continue
to wield unbridled powerwhen dealing with bankruptcy cases.117
Because ofthis, the basic concerns associated with the judge
s
discretionary powerin otherbankruptcy contextsarereciprocated
in Collier
stakeon Chapter9
s§921(c)good faith requirem ent.118
Overall, courtshavenotshied away from im puting a thorough
analysisforChapter9 good faith. Som ecourtshavegonetogreat
lengths by analogizing Chapter 9 cases to Chapter 11 cases.119
Theyhaveexplored a m ultitudeofanalyses, such aslookinginto
theintentofthebankruptcypetitionertofind good orbad faith,120
aswellasotherfact-intensive considerationssuch asthosefound
in Collier
s Chapter 9 good faith schem e.121 However, thisholistic
approach hasnotbeen m ethodizedorwidelyadopted. Even though
theChapter9 good faith analysishasfound som ewhatreasonable
footing in these pastcases, none ofthe previous analyses have
proven to be a viable, definitive standard or testgoing forward.
Nonehave stood outto be theholisticapproach worthy ofwidespread adoption. However, Detroit
s bankruptcy case can fillthe
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note69.
Both Collier
s schem e (in particular, item s (i)(iii))and the Chapter11
good faith testaregrounded upon viewingthesubjectiveintentofthedebtor.
117 Bei
n, supra note95.
118 See id.
119 See infra PartII.C.
120 Id. See also In re Ci
ty ofSan Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 78991
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013);In re N.Y. City Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R.
256, 28081 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010);In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R.
702, 72021 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009);In re Cty. ofOrange, 183 B.R. 594, 608
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
121 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra not
e69.
115
116
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void leftby Congress
s silence in addressing § 921(c)
s good faith
requirem ent. In orderto understand both how Detroit
scase can
be the leading and preem inentguide forfuture cases, and how
thecourthandled thecom plexitiesassociated with Detroit
sChapter9 bankruptcy filing, an overview ofDetroit
sfinancialhistory
leadingup toand includingitsbankruptcyispertinent.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF DETROIT
S BANKRUPTCY
To som e extent, Detroit
s financialdistress was largely foreseeable.122 JudgeRhodesopined thatbecauseDetroitfaced such
overwhelm ing fiscalexigency, even theobjecting creditorsknew
thatthe Chapter9 bankruptcy filing was ultim ately a foregone
conclusion.123 The origins of the city
s anguish can be traced
through the lastseven decadesofDetroit
shistory.124 Thishistory,
however, dem onstratesthatnosingularpersonality oreventled
totheultim atefinancialdownturn. Indeed, m anyfactorsgaverise
to Detroit
sdownward spiral.125
PartII, Section A ofthis Note willdiscuss Detroit
s financial
history priortothebankruptcy filing. Section B willexplorethe
tim eperiod directlyin linewith Detroit
sChapter9 filing. Finally,
Section C willprovide an overview ofDetroit
s Chapter 9 eligibility and the challengesraised by the city
screditors.
A. Detroit in the Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Century
Therewasa longperiod in Am erican history when thecity of
Detroitseem ed infallible.126 Riding alongside the successesofthe
boom ing auto industry, Detroitblossom ed in the early years of
the twentieth century.127 In fact, the firstseven decades ofthe
122 Nat
han Bom ey & John Gallagher, A Free Press Investigation: How
Detroit Went Broke, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 15, 2013).
123 In re Ci
tyofDetroit, 504B.R. 97, 176 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
124 Bom ey& Gal
lagher, supra note122.
125 See Am y Padnani
, Anatomy of Detroits Decline, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8,
2013), http://www.nytim es.com /interactive/2013/08/17/us/detroit-decline.htm l
?_r=0 [http://perm a.cc/NQ8Z-SL9P].
126 Bom ey& Gal
lagher, supra note122.
127 SCOTT MARTELLE, DETROIT:A BIOGRAPHY 95 (
2012).
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twentieth century earm arked the swiftrise ofDetroitasa rich,
prosperouscity.128
Detroit
s clim b to the upperstrata ofAm erican society stem s
from its role as the birthplace and hotbed for m uch ofthe nation
s industrialization.129 Theriseofautom obilem anufacturing
at the turn of the twentieth century predicated this boom in
industry.130 In 1908, Ford MotorCom panyintroduced theModel
T.131 Henry Ford then announced the five-dollar workday in
1914.132 Subsequent to these two events, Ford produced and
distributed over15 m illion ModelTs133 and Detroit
s population
exploded, eventually becom ing the fourth largest city in the
United States.134 Suddenly, Detroitcould offera livablewageto
justaboutanyone.
Bolstered by thisindustrialinflux, Detroiteven m anaged to
enduretheGreatDepression. In the1930s, form erDetroitMayor
Frank Murphy stated:[Detroit] is a great, rich city
it has
neverrepudiated an obligation nor defaulted upon a debt and
itnever will.135 Mayor Murphy
s words m ostly rang true as the
city survived the Great Depression without a total econom ic
collapse, although itdid com e with greathardship.136 Autom obilesalesplunged duetolack ofconsum erism .137 Jobswerecut,
taxes wentunpaid, and the population fluctuated.138 Due to its
lack ofrevenue, the city itselffaced such greathardship thatit
paid policem en, teachers, and othercivicworkersin prom issory
Bom ey& Gallagher, supra note122.
JoelKurth, MikeWilkinson & LouisAguilar, Special ReportSix decades
in Detroit: How abandonment, racial tensions and financial missteps bankrupted the city, DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.detroitnews.com
/article/20131004/METRO01/310040001 [http://perm a.cc/5S3J-49WS].
130 MARTELLE, supra not
e127.
131 HENRY FORD & SAMUEL CROWTHER, MY LIFE AND WORK (
2008). See also
Kurth, Wilkinson & Aguilar, supra note129. In thearticle, long-tim eDetroit
city residentsdescribe theirm em oriesoflooking back into Detroit
s pastand
seeingaUtopia.
132 FORD & CROWTHER, supra not
e131.
133 Id.
134 Bom ey& Gal
lagher, supra note122.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
128
129
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notes, then known as scripts.139 The city struggled, butthere
wasatleastan interm ediateend in sightwhen thenation would
callupon Detroitforhelp.140
ThecityofDetroitfoundanew purposewith theonsetofWorld
WarII.141 Eventually, thecitycom pletelyshutdown com m ercial
autom obile m anufacturing and began m anufacturing tanksand
airplanes for the Allied forces.142 Jobs that had evaporated
during the Great Depression becam e available again and the
industrialboom ofWorld WarII broughtnewfound prosperityto
thecityofDetroit.143 Theeconom y stabilized and the city
spopulation settled.144 Soon afterthewar, Detroitagain becam ethehub
forAm erican auto m anufacturing.145 In fact, the U.S. Censusof
1960 revealed thatDetroithad the highestper-capita incom e of
anyAm erican cityatthetim e.146
While Detroitm aintained its fiscalopulence throughoutthe
m ajorityofthetwentieth century, thecityalsofaced socialillsand
drug issues that threatened the city
s populace as well as its
147
prosperity.
Although m uch ofthe nation endured egregious
hardshipsbroughton by racetensions, Detroitm ay havesuffered
the worst ofit. Finally, in 1967, police invaded an unlicensed
speakeasy operated by African Am ericans, and a ruinous riot
erupted and left43 dead, 1,189 injured, and 2,000 buildingsdestroyed.148 The violence would continue and eventually cause
m anyfam iliesand individualstom oveoutofthecity.149 Thecity
also suffered from the prevalence ofdrugs.150 According to the
DETROIT PUB. LIBRARY, WARTIME DETROIT:THE ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY,
http:/
/web.archive.org/web/20070901171535/http:/
/www.detroit.lib.m i.us/
Golden
JubileeExhibit/GJ%20WEB/II_Wartim e_Detroit.htm [http://perm a.cc/MUW2
-5EPR].
140 See id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 MARTELLE, supra not
e127.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 Detroit is Dying Quickly, FREAKONOMICS (
Mar. 23, 2011), http://freako
nom ics.com /2011/03/23/
detroit-is-dying-quickly/[http:/
/perm a.cc/BK26-AKTD].
147 Kurt
h, Wilkinson & Aguilar, supra note129.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
139
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DetroitNews, theabuseofcrack cocaineserved asa catalystfor
illnessand violence.151 Both hospitaladm ittancesand crim erates
rosedram atically.152 Detroitbecam eknown asthem urdercapital
ofAm erica.153
In addition to a plague ofsocialdecay, Detroit
s steady declinewould continueasthecityfellvictim tostunningfiscallosses
during the 1970s.154 As war broke out in the Middle East in
1973, gaspricesspiked.155 TheDetroiteconom y, which wasbuttressed by gas-guzzling autom obiles, faced an uphillbattle.156
Meanwhile, foreign autom akerswere finding new footing in the
autom obileindustryand threatened theAm erican autoindustry
with com pleteobsolescence.157 NotablejournalistPeterHitchins
wrote that the U.S. car industry lost the confidence even of
patrioticAm ericans, and hasneverfully regained it.158
BecauseDetroitrelied soheavily on thissingleindustry, the
autoindustry would rem ain a com m on indicatorofthedifficulties
ahead. During the1980sand 1990s, theMichigan autoindustry
faced an im m ensedownturn.159 Tradeagreem entswereputinto
place thatostensibly allowed Am erican m anufacturers to leave
the country in favor of foreign countries.160 Therefore, when
these and m any othereconom icand industrialtrendsleftDetroit
s
Id.
Id.
153 Id.
154 Pet
er Hitchins, From Motown to Ghost Town: How the Once Mighty
Detroit is Heading Down a Long, Slow Road to Ruin, DAILY MAIL (July 9,
2011), http://www.dailym ail.co.uk/news/article-2012971/From -Motown-Ghost
-town-How-m ighty-Detroit-heading-long-slow-road-ruin.htm l[http://perm a.cc
/U659-CXJZ].
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 See Ri
chard N. Block & Dale L. Belm an, Automotive and Other Manufacturing Industries in Michigan: Output, Employment, Earnings, and Collective
Bargaining, 19802001, in MICHIGAN AT THE MILLENNIUM 145 (Charles L.
Ballard et al. eds., 2003)(providing an in-depth analysis ofMichigan
s econom icstatureduringthelastfew decadesofthetwentieth century).
160 See Barry Lynn, How Detroit Went Bottom-Up, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (
Sept. 19, 2009), http:
//prospect.org/
article/how-detroit-went-bottom [http:/
/
perm a.cc/SN2T-WWZ5].
151
152
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autoindustryin a precariousposition, thecity, too, found itselfon
hard tim es.
Finally, GeneralMotors
s Rick Wagoner, Ford
s Alan Mulally,
Chrysler
sRobertNardelli, and the presidentofthe United Auto
Workers Union, Ron Gettelfinger, petitioned for a bailoutfrom
Congressin 2008.161 SittingbeforetheSenateBankingCom m ittee,
the corporate executives could not m uster logicalor precise answerswhen confronted with whatwould otherwisebeconsidered
fairly straightforward questions.162 At one point, Senator Bob
CorkerofTennesseeretorted, I justwantthenum bers!163 Unsurprisingly, the auto executives cam e back to the city ofDetroit
em pty-handed. After continued efforts to assuage Congress
s
concerns, allbutFord would partake in a bailoutfunded by the
U.S. Treasury.164 The woes ofthe auto industry prefaced what
wastocom eofthecity.165
B. Detroits Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Filing
Despite the absence ofone singular eventor personality in
Detroit
s history that led to the city
s financial collapse, there
were stillpivotaldecisions and circum stances thathastened or
altogether ensured the downward spiral.166 While the reliance
on the auto industry certainly did nothelp Detroit
s chances of
successattheturn ofthetwenty-firstcentury, m anyofthem ore
overwhelm ing difficultiesthecity faced stem m ed from the city
s
167
poorleadership.
CHARLIE LEDUFF, DETROIT:AN AMERICAN AUTOPSY 82 (2013).
Id.
163 Id.
164 Ki
m berly Am adeo, Auto Industry Bailout (GM, Ford, Chrysler):Why
the Big 3 Needed a Bailout and What It Cost the U.S. Taxpayer, US ECONOMY
(Dec. 21, 2014), http:
//
useconom y.about.com /
od/criticalssues/a/auto_bailout.htm
[http://perm a.cc/3CZC-XY42].
165 Padnani
, supra note125.
166 Id.
167 See Bom ey& Gal
lagher, supra note122. Oneofthefrequentchallenges
Detroit
sleadership faced wastrying to balance a budgetand m ake cuts that
favorlong-term reliefbutadversely affectshort-term gains. Few, ifany, were
willingtorisetom eetthesechallenges. Id.
161
162
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Detroit
s civicleadership has a storied past.168 Whilesom eof
Detroit
s m ayors such as Hazen Pingree and Frank Murphy
willgo down in history assom e ofthe bestthe nation hasever
seen, m any others willalso go down as som e ofthe m ostinept
and corrupt.169 Outofthese ineptand corruptm ayors, Kwam e
Kilpatrick, is widely regarded as the worstofthem .170 Because
Detroitfaced a plethora ofissuesthatwentback m any decades,
Kwam eKilpatrick should notbesingled outasthelonereason for
Detroit
s affliction.171 However, hislegacy servesasa m icrocosm
oftheanguish anddespairthatbefellDetroit.
During Kwam e Kilpatrick
s tim e in office, the city ofDetroit
was already feeling the oppressive approach ofbankruptcy.172
However, in an efforttoevadetotalfinancialcollapse, Kilpatrick
m ade decisionsthatfavored short-term acquiescence overlongterm strategy.173 In a crim e-ridden city, Kilpatrick cutthepolice
forcebyover25 percent.174 Healsoreduced thenum berofpolice
precincts, which resulted in an exponentialincrease in police
response tim e.175 The com bination ofthese decisionsessentially
m adethecityunlivableform any. Although theexodusawayfrom
Detroithad started decadesearlier, thepopulation continued to
dwindle as Detroit lost even m ore of its tax revenue.176 The
faultsofKwam eKilpatrick werem any, butthem ajorissuewas
thathehad favored short-term reliefoverlong-term strategy a
Dan Austin, Meet the 5 Worst Mayors in Detroit History, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (July 23, 2014), http:/
/www.freep.com /article/20140723/OPINION/3072
30054/Meet-5-worst-m ayors-Detroit-history[http://perm a.cc/J4KE-84FA].
169 Id.
170 Id. (

Kilpatrick ism oreculpable and hisconductm orepervasive than
any other public corruption defendantsentenced in recentm em ory,federal
prosecutors said. 
The scale ofhis corruption was astonishing. The im pacton
theregion wasdevastating.
).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. The aut
hornotesthatDetroit
spolice force wentfrom 4,200 officers
to3,000 officers. Id.
175 Id.
176 See Editors Note: The Harris Manifesto, DETROIT METRO TIMES (
Apr. 27,
2005), http:/
/www.m etrotim es.com /
detroit/the-harris-m anifesto/Content?oid=218
1304[http://perm a.cc/R845-2MFX].
168
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strategy that exacerbated Detroit
s financial condition.177 The
m ajorconsequenceofthisfailed reliefwasthatthecity ofDetroit
facedunprecedentedm unicipaldebtwith nowaytopayitback.178
The breaking point for Detroit
s indebtedness occurred in
early 2013. From 1998 to 2012, politiciansfrom Michigan
sstate
governm ent, seated in Lansing, cut Detroit
s state-shared
revenue by 48 percent and withheld $172 m illion from the
city.179 Duetotheserevenuecutsand thelossessuffered from the
reduction ofits tax base, Detroitleadership including Kwam e
Kilpatrick began to reallocate fundsin orderto m eetshort-term
obligations.180 However, theseresponsesfurtherexacerbated the
city
s destitute condition.181 MostofDetroit
s indebtedness arose
from unfunded pension benefitstopreviouscivicem ployeesand
health care liabilities for em ployees past and present.182 Over
halfofthe city
s budgetwas consum ed by these legacy costs.183
These debtholders had been shoved aside, despite other cornercuttingstrategiesbyDetroitleadership.184 Theleveesoon broke.
In the sum m erof2013, Kevyn Orr, a prom inentbankruptcy
attorney atJonesDay, wasappointed asthe city ofDetroit
sem ergency m anagerin a heavily contested situation thatbroughtto
lightm any stateconstitutionalconcerns.185 Theappointm entalso
Id.
Bob Adelm ann, Detroits Bankruptcy Plan Reveals Fraud in Funding
Pensions, THE NEW AMERICAN (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.thenewam erican.com
/
usnews/crim e/
item /17591-detroit-s-bankruptcy-plan-reveals-fraud-in-funding
-pensions[http://perm a.cc/3NNP-JJPE]. Thisarticle suggeststhateven when
Kwam e Kilpatrick did try to addressthe pension liabilities, he did so by clever
legalcircum ventionthatallowed thecity toexceed itsdebtlim it. Id.
179 See Bom ey& Gal
lagher, supra note122.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 See Charl
ie LeDuff, The Americans with Charlie LeDuff: Detroits Bankruptcy is Helping Police Do Their Jobs, YOUTUBE (June26, 2014), https://www
.youtube.com /watch?v=zOWG8Xq3dZA [http://perm a.cc/3EBQ-KY38].
184 Aust
in, supra note168.
185 Moni
ca Davey& Mary William sWalsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles
Into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http:
//
www.nytim es.com /2013/
07/19
/us/detroit-files-for-bankruptcy.htm l?pagewanted=all&_r=2& [http:
//
perm a.cc/
5X
RA-4YGZ].
177
178

2016]

FROM WRECKAGE COMES REASON

263

called into question the legitim acy ofstate lawsthatwere then
recently passed with the intention offueling a push forDetroit
to file for bankruptcy. In the end, the Michigan leadership,
spearheaded by the efforts ofGovernorSnyderand Em ergency
ManagerOrr, opted forChapter9 bankruptcyin a finaleffortto
savethecity.
C. Detroits Chapter 9 Eligibility
In som e ways, Detroit
s financialhistory isanalogousto the
historiesofm anyotherbankruptm unicipalentities. Detroitcertainly was not the first m unicipality to face bankruptcy in
response to insurm ountable debtwroughtby a m ultitude ofadverse conditions.186 For exam ple, Detroit
s predecessor in the
record books forlargestm unicipalbankruptcy, Jefferson County, Alabam a, also had m illions ifnotbillions in debtaccrued
through sim ilar debt issuances, such as m unicipalbonds and
retirem entand healthcareservicesrendered topastand current
civicem ployees.187 However, Detroitisa uniquecase, especially
in its m agnitude. With its debtcalculated som ewhere between
$18 and $20 billion,188 Em ergency ManagerKevyn Orrand the
financialm anager
s team had to m ove quickly in order to stop
the bleeding. Subsequently, Orr im m ediately initiated prepetition bankruptcyproceedings.189
The Honorable Judge Stephen Rhodes, sitting on the bench
forthebankruptcy courtfortheEastern DistrictofMichigan, was
assigned Detroit
s case atthe triallevel.190 Hisfirstassignm ent
was to rule on Detroit
s Chapter 9 eligibility under 11 U.S.C
191
§109(c).
This task was the beginning ofwhatwas to becom e
an arduousprocessofweeding through state constitutionallaw
186 Mar
y William sWalsh, In Alabama, a County That Fell Off the Financial
Cliff, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2012), http:/
/www.nytim es.com /
2012/02/
19/
business
/jefferson-county-ala-falls-off-the-bankruptcy-cliff.htm l?pagewanted=all [http://
perm a.cc/K7HH-9TCR].
187 Id.
188 Hel
m s& Bom ey, supra note1.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
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and bankruptcy law whilealsom anaging theoutward challenge
of a vast num ber of creditors who actively contested Detroit
s
eligibility. Despitethisadded difficulty, JudgeRhodesultim ately ruled in favorofDetroit
sChapter9 eligibility.192 Forthem ost
part, Judge Rhodesgracefully considered the creditorsargum ents
forineligibility butcam e down firm on why Detroitm aintained
itseligibilityunder§109(c).193
The m ost pertinent conclusions reached in Judge Rhodes
s
§ 109(c)analysis were (1)thatDetroit
s prepetition negotiations
wereconducted in good faith;194 and (2)thatDetroitdesire[d]to
effecta plan to adjustsuch debts.195 Thesedeterm inationswould
play a continued role laterin Judge Rhodesopinion, in which he
tackled Detroit
sgood faith filingrequirem entunder§921(c).196
In addition to challenges under § 109(c), Detroit
s creditorobjectors took issue with the petition being filed in good faith
under§ 921(c).197 Judge Rhodesnoted thatsom e ofthese objectionsm ayhavebeen broughton bypotentiallyvalidfindingsstem m ing from im portant concerns.198 However, had Judge Rhodes
considered these objections without looking at the petition
s
broadercontext, Detroit
screditor-objectors could have thwarted
the city
sonly reasonable m eansofrecovery. Judge Rhodescould
haveonlylooked attheintentand actionsofthosefilingthepetition or adopted the basic Chapter 11 test. Furtherm ore, the
courtcould have sim ply decided on the creditor-objectorsclaim
thatEm ergency ManagerOrrand GovernorSnyderacted with
im propriety in the first place. In both ofthese circum stances,
which were used in other Chapter 9 cases, Detroit
s chances of
recovery could have been lost. Instead, Judge Rhodes appropriately viewed Detroit
s circum stanceswholly to decide the §921(c)
and § 109(c)eligibility thresholds, in lightofthe possibility of
valid concernsraised bythecreditor-objectors.199
Id.
Id.
194 11 U.S.C. § 109(
c)(5)(2012);In re City ofDetroit, 504 B.R. 97, 110
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
195 11 U.S.C. §109(
c)(4)(2012);In re CityofDetroit, 504B.R. at172.
196 In re Ci
ty ofDetroit, 504 B.R. at17989.
197 Id. at112.
198 See id. at187.
199 See id. at18789.
192
193
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III. DETROIT
S BANKRUPTCY PETITION AND THE §921(
C)
GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT
In the lastsection ofIn re Detroit, Judge Rhodes addressed
Detroit
s good faith filing requirem entunder § 921(c).200 By this
point, JudgeRhodeshad already ruled thatGovernorSnyderand
Em ergency ManagerOrrdid notviolate Michigan state constitutionalconcerns.201 Adding on to this, Judge Rhodes convincingly arrived attheconclusion thatDetroithad sufficiently m et
§ 921(c)
s good faith petitioning requirem ent.202 However, Judge
Rhodes used considerable tactnotonly to address the creditorobjectorsclaim s butalso to address the good faith requirem ent
in lightofcircum stancesnottraditionally prescribed by §921(c)
case law.203 Whathe arrived atwas a m ore com plete and thorough analysisoftheissuesim plicated under§921(c).204 By doing
so, Judge Rhodes carved a path for a m ore practicable and
principled good faith analysis. However, JudgeRhodeshad togo
togreatlengthstoputthisanalysistogether.
The creditor-objectors (m any ofwhom were represented by
som e of the best attorneys in the country) brought up every
instancepossiblein ordertoshow thatDetroithad petitioned for
Chapter9 bankruptcyin bad faith.205 Indeed, JudgeRhodesnoted
dozensoftestim onialsthatalleged im propriety in allstagesleading up to the bankruptcy.206 For exam ple, unions representing
Detroit
spolice and firefightersargued one ofthe City
sexpress
purposes... isto attem ptto use these Chapter9 proceedingsto
illegally im pair the constitutionally protected pension rights of
em ployees and retirees.207 However, this argum ent, as wellas
Id. at17989.
See id. at15467.
202 See id. at17989.
203 Mel
issa B. Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility, 41 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 849, 853 (2014)(The written decision finding Detroit eligible for
Chapter9 responded toarem arkablenum berofobjectionsin detail.).
204 Id. at865 (
[W]hathappensin thisbankruptcy could seta blueprintfor
futurem unicipalcases.).
205 See In re Ci
ty ofDetroit, 504 B.R. at18187.
206 See id.
207 Id.
200
201
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m any others, proved to lack m eritbecause Judge Rhodesalready
ruled that Michigan state constitutionality concerns were unfounded. Ultim ately, a large portion ofthe objections were dism issed upon a finding thatthey were eithertoo vague orsim ply
unsupported by particular evidence to m ove the result in the
creditor-objectorsfavor.208
Whileaddressingthem ostpotentofthecreditor-objectorconcerns, Judge Rhodes laid outa four-partanalysis to determ ine
whetherDetroithad m etthe requirem ents forgood faith filing
under§921(c).209 Itisim portanttonote, however, thatnowhere
in theopinion did JudgeRhodesstatethatthefour-partanalysis
he provided forconsidering § 921(c)good faith issueswasto be
understood as the definitive test m oving forward. Furtherm ore,
JudgeRhodescited otherprom inent§921(c)caseswhilesetting
up his test for Detroit
s good faith assessm ent.210 Therefore,
m uch ofJudge Rhodes
s test is akin to past Chapter 9 assessm ents,211 butJudge Rhodes
stestalso exploresdeeperand m ore
equitablefacetsassociated with theconsequencesofa dism issal
ofa Chapter9 petition under§ 921(c). Judge Rhodes
stestoffers
a com pelling hybrid ofm any ofthe prom inent § 921(c)cases
whilealsoconsideringthecom plexity ofDetroit
sbankruptcy case.
A. Step One: Contemplation of Chapter 9 Relief
The firststep in Judge Rhodes
stestwasto ask whetherthe
City
s financialproblem s are ofa typecontem plated forChapter
9 relief.212 At this stage, Judge Rhodes argued that Detroit
s
Id. at 183 (The Court finds, however, that in som e particulars, the
record does support the objectorsview ofthe reality that led to this bankruptcy filing. Itis, however, notnearly supported in enough particulars for
theCourtto find thatthe filing wasin bad faith.).
209 Id.
210 Id. at187. The t
wo prim ary cases Judge Rhodes used in establishing
his good faith analysis were Stockton and N.Y. City OffTrack Betting.
However, healsoused individualcasestosupporteach step ofhisgood faith
determ ination. See id. at18789.
211 The f
irsttwo and arguably the firstthree partsofthe RhodesTest,
havebeen explored in previouscasesthataddress§921(c). However, looking
into the prejudice placed upon the city
s residents was a largely unprecedented
step in Chapter9 caselaw.
212 In re Ci
tyofDetroit, 504B.R. at187.
208
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financialsituation was exacerbated by the city
s shortcom ings,
butthatthe city
s problem s were very rightfully in line with the
typescontem plated forChapter9 relief.213 In theopinion, Judge
Rhodeswrote:
ItistruethattheCity doesnothavea clearpictureofitsassets, incom e, cash flow, and liabilities, likelybecauseitsbookkeeping and accounting system s are obsolete. But this only
suggeststheneed forrelief. Itdoesnotsuggestbad faith. Moreover, as the City
s financialanalystssubsequent m onths of
work have sharpened the focus on the City
s finances, the resultingpicturehasonlybecom eworse.214

Here, JudgeRhodesnoted thatm any oftheobjectionspushed for
bythecreditor-objectorswerenotgrounded in indicationsoflack
ofgood faith, butm ore properly expressed a m ultitude ofareas
wherethecity hasexperienced egregiousproblem sand shortcom ings.215 Moreover, JudgeRhodesconcluded thatChapter9 islikely
the only rem edy thataffords the city the protection it needs to
solvetheseissues.216 Whatism ostim portantaboutJudge Rhodes
s
analysis here is that he focused on the m unicipality
s objectively
identifiable problem s thatcalled for Chapter9 reliefand noton
thesubjectiveargum entspushedforwardbytheopposingparties.
B. Step Two: Consistency with the Remedial Purpose of Chapter 9
In his second consideration of Detroit
s good faith under
§ 921(c), Judge Rhodeslooked to see ifthe reasonsforfiling [for
Chapter9]are consistentwith the rem edialpurpose ofChapter
9.217 Judge Rhodes noted that the rem edialpurpose soughtby
Detroitwasto receive a breathing spellin orderto establish a
plan for adjustm ent.218 This language m irrors the highly subjective219 elem entof§ 109(c)(4)in which a m unicipality m ust
213

Id.

214 Id.

Id.
Id. at189.
217 Id. at187.
218 Id. (
quoting In re Cty. ofOrange, 183 B.R. 594, 607 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1995)).
219 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra not
e69.
215
216
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desire[]to effect a plan to adjust such debts.220 Here, Judge
Rhodes delved into any possible ulteriorm otivesofthe m unicipality
s leaders and looked for em piricalevidence, rather than
guessingatthesubjectiveintentionsofthem unicipality.221
Judge Rhodes ultim ately found that Detroit
s bankruptcy
petition was filed for the exactreason ofachieving a breathing
spell so that it could adjust its debt.222 The creditor-objectors
argued thatthe city
sendeavortoim pairthepaym entofpension
obligations was inconsistent with any rem edial purpose for
Chapter9.223 However, Judge Rhodesreduced thisargum entto
sem anticsby illustrating thatim pairing pension paym entswith
the help ofChapter 9 is, in the net result, equivalent to discharging debtowed tocreditors. Ultim ately, itisconsistentwith
alawfulavailm entoffederalbankruptcylaw.224
C. Step Three: Detroits Efforts to Improve the State of its Finances
In exploring a third factorin Detroit
s good faith petitioning
requirem ent, Judge Rhodes m ade a difficult determ ination of
whetherthe m unicipality had m adeeffortstoim provethestate
ofits finances priorto filing, to no avail.225 JudgeRhodesquickly
determ ined that Em ergency Manager Kevyn Orr had gone to
considerable lengths in order to im prove the m unicipality
s finances.226 Judge Rhodes noted thatthe efforts included reducing
the num ber of City em ployees, reducing labor costs through
im plem entation ofthe City Em ploym entTerm s, increasing the
City
scorporate tax rate, working to im prove the City
sability to
collecttaxes, increasing lighting rates, deferring capitalexpenditures, reducing vendor costs, and reducing subsidies to the
DetroitDepartm entofTransportation.227 These efforts proved
11 U.S.C. §109(c)(4)(2014).
In re City ofDetroit, 504 B.R. at18788.
222 Id. at187 (
quotingIn re Cty. ofOrange, 183 B.R. 594, 607 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1995)).
223 Id. at188.
224 Id. (
citing In re Chilhowee RIV Sch. Dist., 145 B.R. 981, 983 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1992)).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at188.
220
221
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insufficienttostaveofftheinevitablebankruptcypetition, butthey
paved thewayforhealthydecisionstobem adeunderChapter9
protections.228 Furtherm ore, Judge Rhodes reduced any argum entto an absurdity by stating thatdeny[ing]Detroit
s opportunity to reorganize in chapter 9 based on lack ofgood faith
would betoignorefiscalreality and thegeneralpurposesofthe
Bankruptcy Code.229
D. Step Four: Residents of Detroit Potentially Prejudiced
The biggest departure Judge Rhodes took in ruling on Detroit
s § 921(c)good faith was in his finalstep, where he asked
whether [t]he residents ofDetroitwillbe severely prejudiced if
thiscase isdism issed.230 JudgeRhodesnoted thatthisconsideration was ofparam ountim portance.231 However, thisconsideration wasunique toDetroit
sbankruptcy case. Thisuniquenessis
likelyduetoalongstandingbankruptcyprinciplethatthedebtors
and creditors are the only parties with whom bankruptcy law
should concern itself.232 However, Chapter 9 is once again distinctfrom otherform sofbankruptcyin thisregard. Thetruebenefit ofconsidering the prejudice to the city
s residents is that if
thedism issaloftheChapter9 bankruptcywould resultin prejudicetothem , then itvalidatesthenecessity forChapter9 relief.
Ultim ately, the city of Detroit
s residents have benefited m ore
than anybody by Judge Rhodes
s decision to allow the city bankruptcyprotection.
E. The Effects of Detroits Eligibility on the City
With over one hundred parties actively opposing Detroit
s
bankruptcy and challenging itfrom a m ultitudeofangles, Detroit
s
233
Chapter9 eligibilitywastenuous. Asm entioned above, ifJudge
Rhodeshad taken an approach sim ilartom any otherChapter9
cases, which turned on thegood faith requirem entunder§921(c),
Id.
Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at189.
232 Pl
ank, supra note16, at51618.
233 Jacoby, supra not
e203, at853.
228
229
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then Detroit could have lost its only valuable opportunity for
recovery.234 However, the im portance of Detroit
s Chapter 9
eligibility, in lightofpotent§921(c)challenges, isunm istakable
in how thecityhasused thiseligibilitytoreviveitself.
Although Detroit
sbankruptcy exitplan wasapproved in Novem ber of2014, the positive effects of Detroit
s Chapter 9 eligibility were felt alm ost im m ediately upon Judge Rhodes
s
decision. With perm ission togoahead, Kevyn Orrtook bold and
dram atic steps to help the ailing city. The city received m uchneeded flexibility because it could use the m oney saved from
paying offim m ediate debtobligations on functions essentialto
the city
s operation.235 These operationswould have been m uch
m ore difficultwithoutChapter 9 protection. One ofKevyn Orr
s
strongestm ovesasDetroit
sEm ergencyManagerwasappointing
a new ChiefofPolice.236 Heappointed Jam esCraig and allotted
extra revenue to add m ore officers and provide better equipm ent.237 Jam es Craig brought m uch-needed experience to the
position, asheform erlyserved asthechiefofpoliceforthecityof
Cincinnati.238 Due to these changes m ade underOrrand Craig
s
direction, crim ehasgonedown.239
Detroithasalso found new life with increased industry from
sources both old and new.240 Detroit
s fabled auto industry has
234 Id.

235 See also Charl
ie LeDuff, The Americans with Charlie LeDuff: Detroits
Bankruptcy is Helping Police Do Their Jobs, YOUTUBE (June 26, 2014), https:/
/
www.youtube.com /watch?v=zOWG8Xq3dZA [https://perm a.cc/TAK3-3VLU]
(Ironically, because Detroitisbankrupt, Detroitpolice are doing better. Less
m oneybeingpaidtothecreditorsm eansm orem oneyinvested in thepolice.).
236 Gena Dam ron & Mat
tHelm s, Detroits New Police Chief James Craig:
Ive Come Home, DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 15, 2013), http://archive.freep
.com /article/20130515/NEWS01/305150098/Detroit-police-chief-Craig [http://
perm a.cc/PG64-V7B7].
237 Id. Som eoft
hem uch-needed fundscam efrom generousdonationsfrom
Detroit
s Big Three autom akers. GM, Ford, and Chrysler offered Detroit$22
m illion tohelp revitalizethecity
scivicfunctions. Id.
238 Id.
239 BarbaraL. McQuade, U.S. Attorney: Violent Crime is Falling in Detroit,
DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 10, 2014), http:
//
www.detroitnews.com /story/
opinion/
2014
/10/10/m cquade-violent-crim e-falls-detroit/16992633/ [http://perm a.cc/E8SA
-HDFB](Detroitison pacetohaveitsfewesthom icidesin thecitysince1967.).
240 See Ti
m Alberta, Why Detroits New Mayor Thinks His City Is Poised for
an Economic Reinvention, NAT
L JOURNAL (
Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.national
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found renewed success.241 The realestate m arketin downtown
Detroithasseen a significantspike.242 Em ploym enthasrisen.243
Recognizing higherem ploym entrates, thepopulation hasbegun
to return.244 Even foreign investors have pinned their eyes on
Detroitas an inevitable com eback story.245 However, the recent
revitalization would likely nothavebeen possible ifDetroithad
notgone through bankruptcy.246 The com eback story m ay not
havebegun withoutJudgeRhodes
spartin Detroit
sbankruptcy.
Indeed, Judge Rhodes went to considerable lengths to addressDetroit
sgood faith petitioning in accordance with § 921(c).
Such an in-depth analysis is unparalleled in other Chapter 9
cases. Yetitis inescapable thatJudge Rhodes
s testis, atm ost,
a judicially rendered guideline for conducting Chapter 9
s good
faith filing analysis. In its present incarnation, it is not, and
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likely willnotbe, m andatory authority thatother courts m ust
follow. However, with a substantialgap in statutory authority
and silencefrom Congress, thereisperhapsnom orepracticable
orprincipled approach than Judge Rhodes
stestfordeterm ining
Chapter9 eligibility in lightofcreditor-objectorgood faith challenges. Therefore, untilam endm ents to the Bankruptcy Code
provide new statutory scaffolding for § 921(c)
s good faith requirem ents, Judge Rhodes
s test can stand out as particularly
instructive. Itprovidesm anageable pointsofassessm entin the
good faith analysis and ensures that the best interests ofall
parties in a m unicipalbankruptcy case are being considered.
Municipalities and bankruptcy courts alike can look to Detroit
s
casetofind a pragm aticand principled approach wherea dearth
of legislative instruction and statutory authority has left a
substantialgapin bankruptcylaw.
CONCLUSION:SPERAMUS MELIORA |RESURGET CINERIBUS
The city ofDetroit
s flag is em blazoned with two wom en gesturingtowardstwoverydifferentcityscapes. On theleft, asorrowfulwom an isfacing a burning city silhouette, which represents
the once-fallen Detroitafter the greatfire of1805. Below this
scene, the Latin words speramus meliora are inscribed, which
translates to we hope for betterthings.On the right, however,
a wom an with a m ore uprightand confidentpostureispointing
towards a lush, reconstructed cityscape. This picture sits atop
the Latin words resurget cineribus, which m eans it willrise
from the ashes.
The im agery depicted in Detroit
s flag is a fitting display of
the city
s past and current hardships. Indeed, the last seven
decades ofDetroit
s history m ark the second tim e the city has
fallen. This tim e, the city suffered the slow burn ofineptitude,
failure, and corruption.
However, throughout Detroit
s Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings, thecity hasbegun thelong, slow riseoutoftheashes.
Although the hardship is far from over, the city ofDetroithas
taken significantstepssince itwasafforded bankruptcy protection under Chapter 9. The year 2014 m arked the arduous and
painfulprocess ofdebt restructuring, but the city found relief
and even successthrough itsbankruptcyprotection.
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JudgeRhodesultim ately ruled thatDetroit
s eligibility could
notbethwarted byitscreditors. Hisrulingconsidered fourm ain
principles. Each oftheseprincipleshelped paintthelandscapeof
§ 921(c)
sgood faith requirem ent. However, before Judge Rhodes
opined on them atter, theseconsiderationshad notbeen synthesized intoone opinion and m ethodized within existing caselaw.
Histestcan bring a practicable and principled good faith standard to m unicipalbankruptcy proceedings. Now, other m unicipalitiesand bankruptcy courtsalikecan look to In re Detroit as
a signalofstability within an im preciseand precariousrealm of
bankruptcy jurisprudenceand Am erica can look toDetroittofind
hopethatit, too, can find reason in wreckage.

